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The Concept of Competence – an 
Instrument of Social and Political 
Change 
Introduct ion 1 
The concept of ‘competence’ has made, in the last 10 years, a remarkable career in many 
EU countries. It almost substituted the concept of ‘qualification’ in scientific and 
political debate – like the term ‘competence development’ marginalized that of 
‘continuous training’. Huge quantities of related publications appeared, and a similarly 
huge number of research and development projects organised around this argument 
were funded. Though some forerunners had existed in the US and Canada, the 
emergence and rapid proliferation of this term is an astonishing phenomenon that needs 
explanation: Someone coming back from the Mars to Europe after 20 years of absence 
would be highly surprised discovering the new concept and the apparent consensus it 
had won in a short time.  
What does the emergence of the concept of competence mean, how is it to be 
explained? 
Based on research on early forms of institutionalised assessment of competences that 
I did in the mid 90s in France2 and on continuous observation of the evolution of 
competence-centered debates and policies in France, the UK and Germany, I can and 
will present some central elements for an evaluation of this societal phenomenon3. And 
I will focus primarily on its genesis and its potentials for socio-political change that are 
very rarely discussed (and even more rarely in a coherent way). 
In the first part of my contribution, I will question the content of the competence 
concept, in the second part I will show central elements of the strategy and the process 
of its implementation in national societies. Then, in the third part, I will analyse the 
main change targets which this concept is aiming for, i. e. the consequences of its 
realisation. The following part is dedicated to the success the concept has had up to now 
and to its possible future. And the last part briefly addresses the question of an adequate 
theoretical interpretation of the emergence and career of the competence-concept.  
                                                 
1 Presentation at the Rokkan Centre on 11th September 2003. 
2 Ingrid Drexel: Die Bilans de Compètences – ein neues Instrument der Arbeits- und Bildungspolitik in Frankreich. 
In: QUEM (Hg.) Kompetenzentwicklung `97. Muenster u. a. 1997. 
3 Ingrid Drexel: Das Konzept von Kompetenz und die Interessen der gesellschaftlichen Akteure – Erfahrungen aus 
dem europaeischen Ausland. In: P. Dehnbostel u. a. (Hg.): Vernetzte Kompetenzentwicklung, Berlin 2002 
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As proof and illustration I will mainly use the case of France, but not only – the UK 
and the German experiences are sometimes too interesting not to speak of. France and 
UK are relatively in the forefront of the discussion and implementation of competence-
oriented policies; Germany is rather late, so I will refer to this country a little less than 
might be expected. 
And I will not at all speak of Norway though I learned during the last weeks, that 
here too a competence act and corresponding policies do exist. But as far as I can judge, 
this is – apart from the term and some techniques – quite different from what is going 
on in the EU-countries that I am going to speak of.  
The content  of  the  competence-concept  –  
some common e lements  despi te  a  broad 
var iety  of  interpretat ions 
Let me start with one – at a first glance very surprising – observation that all authors 
comparing the use of this term agree on: A precise common definition of this term does 
not exist, neither within national contexts nor on an international level, – despite of the 
fact that much of competence-related publication work is explicitly dedicated to the 
definition of the content of this concept. Definitions thus produced show a great variety 
of accents according to the scientific or political background of the author. And the 
profiles of definition in the different countries seem to vary with problems in the 
education and vocational training systems existing in these countries (interpreted of 
course in a specific way by the author). 
Despite of this variety, five central elements of the competence-concept can be 
identified: 
 
1) In contrast to the qualification concept that is oriented towards societally 
organized and regulated learning processes (at the University, in apprenticeship 
etc), the competence-concept is output-oriented. That means: It is focussing on the 
results of any possible learning process, learning being defined in a very broad or 
even unlimited sense, with specific importance given to the results of informal 
learning («experience learning»). Questions of the organisation and quality of the 
learning process are irrelevant – what counts is the outcome. 
2) As a consequence of this dissociation of qualification (or competence) and 
formal learning processes, the competence-concept asks for procedures for 
identifying and assessing the results of learning processes that can make them visible. Such 
procedures and their institutional and financial bases are either newly created or 
existing structures are elaborated for that purpose: 
• In the UK, the Thatcher-government has created the NVQ-system with 
a complex organisational structure for the assessment of about 8oo 
officially recognized competences and for their classification according 
to their efficiency in work process at five levels. 
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• In Germany, actually many research and development projects try to 
define methods of assessment and certification of all kinds of 
competences. 
• In France, such procedures can build upon the fundaments of the 
existing bilans de compétences which in the early 90s began to be used 
in some big companies for certain purposes of their Human Resource 
policy and for some social goals4. Later on, when the competence-
concept was appropriated by the employers organisation and 
functionalised for an aggressive restructuration policy – we will come 
back to this in detail further on – , the system of bilans de competences 
was elaborated according to these goals. 
3) A third basic element of the competence-concept consists in the fact that it 
devaluates knowledge and formalized qualification in favour of experience, and 
that it attributes a central role to immediate operability of workforces competences. 
4) Almost as important is the fact that the concept includes not only formal and 
informal knowledge and skills but also personal values, motivations and behaviour. 
5) And last but not least, the concept aims at and implies the individualisation and 
fragmentation of learning results leading to an unlimited quantity of atomistic, very 
narrowly cut competences – a goal that replaces the holistic concept of 
qualification that was promoted since the 60ies and the 70ies. These atomistic 
competences can be combined in absolute flexibility: The vision is an unlimited 
variety of patchwork profiles that can substitute the traditional structure of 
workforce categories (technicians, engineers etc.) whose qualification profiles are 
roughly determined by formalized learning tracks regulated by society and by its 
dominant patterns of work organisation. 
The implementat ion of  the competence-
concept  in  nat ional  soc iet ies  and the  
actors  of  th is  process  
The concept of competence did not fall from heaven, its implementation in the 
European discussions and policies had and has its actors. Of course I cannot give a 
complete and detailed description of the single moments of its emergence in every 
country and its evolution there. But I can and will present a rough picture of the main 
categories of actors, their implementation strategy and – as an example – of central 
elements of the implementation process in one country: France. 
Important impulses for the concept and its diffusion came from the European 
Commission: Though the term «competence» and some practise of assessment of 
competences had pre-existed, it was the EC that defined much of the competence-
philosophy and who gave central ideas and incentives for its implementation; research 
                                                 
4 For details see Drexel 1997 (note 1) 
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funding played an important role in that context. So I will start with the EC though 
there are other actors as you will see. 
1) EC conceived a strategy for implementing the competence-concept in the national 
societies – a strategy that involved as many and different social actors as 
possible: not only employers and politicians, but also unions and company level 
labour representatives, intermediate institutions like consultants and 
professionals working in the fields of vocational training, Human resource 
policy and labour market, and last but not least research.  
 This strategy was masterly followed for example in France: Here, the 
idea of assessing and recognizing individual competences had, as I said before, 
been used already in the late 80s and the early 90s by some companies for 
various purposes of their Human Resource policies. In the beginnings of the 90s 
an act was passed providing everyone with the right to a leave of 24 hours for a 
‘bilan de compétence’, i.e. for exploration, assessment and recognition of all 
her/his skills, knowledge and capacities, wherever they might have been 
acquired. These bilans de compétence were set up by public or semi-public 
institutions or by private bilancing firms created for that purpose. The goal of 
the act was essentially to encourage people to engage in relevant continuous 
training activities and /or in inner- and inter-company mobility. However, this 
new possibility was soon mainly used by companies for sending their employees 
to an assessment of their competences in preparation of mass dismissals. So, the 
instrument quickly got heavily stigmatised; in the middle of the 90s, it had lost 
almost all credibility among employed workforce and was predominantly used 
for unemployed5.  
 After this «prehistory», towards the end of the 90s, the mighty employers 
organisation CNPF (later on renamed MEDEF) appropriated the competence-
concept for a very firm strategy of multidimensional change and started an 
impressionating campaign of its implementation:  
• with considerable media work and high level political debate in favour of 
the concept, 
• with lots of multi-partite working groups, big conferences and travels to 
visit such companies and countries that seemed to prove the relevance 
and value of the competence-concept,  
• and with hundreds of top company representatives, union 
representatives, politicians, consultants, researchers and media people 
participating in these activities, collective travels included. 
Thus, after two or three years of campaign, the competence-concept had 
conquered a favourite place in the media and in a good deal of scientific debate 
about the future of education and training; and it had won an apparently broad 
societal consensus. Critical voices and dissensus were and are rare or limited to 
specific aspects.  
                                                 
5 For details see Drexel 1997 
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 This is quite surprising given the fact that MEDEF from the very 
beginning was quite clear about the two main goals of the promoted «démarche 
de la compétence»: 
• the devaluation of the school diplomas that in France are traditionally 
determining  
• companies recruitment policies and to a certain degree also the systems 
of wage 
• classifications; and  
• the transfer of the recognition of relevant competences to the employer 
– and thereby a transfer of wage determination to the company-level. 
Let me quote in this context the definition of competence that has been formally 
authorised by MEDEF6: «Professional competence is a combination of 
knowledge, skills, experiences and behaviour-related capacities (savoir etre) that 
are put into practise in a specific context. It (the competence-I.D.) can be 
identified only in its application in a professional situation. On this base it can be 
recognized. Therefore it is up to the company to assess, to evaluate, to recognize 
and to develop the competence»7. 
2) After this example for a creative and powerful realization of the EC‘s general 
strategy for the implementation of the competence-concept in EU societies, let 
me come to the EC and national strategies concerning the role of social research in 
this context: Huge European research programs were launched around the 
concept of competences and informal learning, followed later on by national 
programs in this line. They were dedicated mainly to the definition of 
competence – especially competences being the product of learning integrated in 
the work process – , to experiments with the implementation in companies and 
to the development of technical instruments for identifying, measuring and 
certifying competences.  
 These programs favoured firm-near types of research like Human 
Resource-research, business-management research and certain specialities of 
psychology and pedagogics as well as their interdisciplinary and international 
cooperation, but also involved sociological research.The funding conditions 
obliged the researchers to do a lot of work for the «dissemination» of the results, 
i. e. publications, conferences etc.. Due to parallel cuttings of other national 
research budgets, these programs and their conditions had great effects. This can 
explain a good deal of the inflation of corresponding publications and some of 
its characteristics: repetivity, the dominance of normative and/or technical 
aspects and the scarcity of critical empirical research. A certain type of questions 
                                                 
6 CNPF: Journées internationales de la Formation 1998 – Objectif Compétences. Tme 4 : Identifier et decrire les 
compétences professionnelles. Paris 1998 
7 In Germany, the implementation process was mainly driven by a little group of persons from the education 
ministery (in strong dissense with other parts of this institution) and consultants as well as professors of business 
management. Despite of this difference in the actors, the strategy of involving as many groups and people as 
possible in the implementation process is very similar to that followed in France, though with less success up to 
now. 
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prevail, like «What is competence ? How is competence produced? How can it 
be measured? How can it be utilized for specific problems?“ Other questions, 
like «What are the advantages, what are the risks of a generalized competence-
approach in society? What interests (interest-groups) promote it and to what 
ends?» are almost missing. 
 So, we can watch a remarkable change of a research field that before had 
been dominated by critical and methodologically ambitious empirical (often 
sociological) research. This change is partly due to the fact, at least in Germany, 
that the new targets and conditions of public research funding opened the door 
for researchers with less defined scientific and political positions and with more 
availability for this kind of research. Established research groups on the other 
hand that traditionally had been focussing on the existing VET-system had more 
and more difficulties finding public financing for this research. They could not 
always avoid acquiring projects from these competence-centered programs – 
either joining then the chorus of competence or using these funds for some 
critical observations, but nevertheless refraining from open attacks in view of 
future funding. This helps to explain the surprising scarcity of critical voices 
from research. 
3) By and large, much of the research in this field thereby became part of the 
growing new branch of competence-related activities:  
• activities of political and technical implementation of competence-
procedures within companies on the one hand – these activities are 
mainly the field of private consultancy of all kinds but include also 
professors nobilizing it;  
• and company external services of identification, assessment and 
recognition of the results of prior learning on the other hand – these 
activities are the field of growing quantities of more or less specialized 
institutions. 
These activities are sometimes very well paid and sometimes rather precarious – 
but anyway they constitute a new occupational branch that has an important role 
in the implementation of the competence-concept. Your co-national Jens 
Bjørnavold who analysed the reports of about 15 countries on identification and 
recognition of informal learning results summarizes this phenomenon with the 
words «solutions seeking problems and suppliers seeking customers»8. And he 
adds: «The development of measurement and assessment methodologies can 
only in a few cases be described as driven by demand or as a push from the 
bottom up. If we study the last half of the 1990s when this trend gained 
momentum and strength, the existence of programs like ADAPT and the 
LEONARDO DA VINCI at European and sector levels have contributed to 
the setting and changing of the ‘assessment agenda’. The availability of ‘fresh 
money’, linked to a limited set of specific priorities, inspired a high number of 
                                                 
8 Jens Bjørnavold: Making learning visible – Identification, assessment and recognition of non-formaal learning in 
Europe. Thessaloniki 2000 
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institutions to involve themselves in the development of instruments and tools. 
Although the results of these projects may be of varying quality, the long-term 
impacts on the agenda of the organisations and institutions involved should not 
be underestimated» (ibid, p. 185). 
 With this quotation I`ll end this analysis of central elements of the 
implementation of the competence-concept – a rather detailed description 
because of its specific interest for researchers and because of its more general 
interest for democratic thinking that may question this stile of change policy.  
The competence-concept  and soc io-
pol i t ica l  change –  poss ib le  consequences 
for  soc iet ies  
Let me analyse now (briefly and rather summarily) the main explicit and implicit 
objectives of the competence-concept, i. e. the consequences it would have if becoming 
reality. I will focus on five dimensions of social and political change:  
 
1) The value of public or semi-public diplomas would be marginalized or even substituted 
by the value of competences fixed by individual companies or by company-near 
institutions of competence assessment and recognition. In education and 
vocational training, this would very probably lead to a strong decrease in the 
responsibility of state and companies for organized learning processes: for their accessibility 
for everyone, for the regulation of a certain quality and last but not least for 
financing publicly organized learning processes. State and company money 
would then be needed for the installation and continuous support of the heavy 
apparatus of competence assessment and recognition and its complex 
procedures. 
2) Workforce-categories with their societally defined broad qualification profiles 
would be replaced by narrowly cut competence profiles and competence 
combinations depending fully on the hazards of individual private and work 
biographies. This would destroy the prerequisites for horizontal mobility, and it 
would thereby destroy professional labour markets. The ties binding the worker to his 
or her company would become much stronger – unilaterally of course. 
3) At the same time the disappearance of societal learning tracks and of 
corresponding workforce categories would generalize the great risks that individuals 
with only company-and job-specific qualifications always have: 
• high unemployment risks, and  
• a high degree of dependence from their company and, as a consequence, 
a weak base for the defense of their interests. 
4) To such a weakening of the worker’s position in his/her relation to the employer would 
contribute the fact that the competence concept includes, as I mentioned, not 
only skills and experiences, but also values, norms and motivations. It is obvious 
that this opens the door for worker recruitment according to political criteria 
and for covered forms of repression in case of «deviant» thinking and behaviour. 
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A lot of inner firm democracy and interest representation that was built up since 
the post-war period risks erosion and disappearance. 
5) Last but not least, the devaluation of a society’s diplomas would undermine 
collective agreements and substitute them by company-specific or individual wage 
bargaining. Even if, under favourable conditions like in big companies, work 
councils might be involved in fixing conditions of competence recognition and 
in fixing wages, this would mean the disappearance of unifying forces that up to 
now had guaranteed certain minimal basic incomes for all workers – also for 
those in small firms. And it would mean an extreme weakening of unions as the 
force that has to defend general workforce interests beyond the single company. 
 Such and comparable consequences are inherent in the competence-
concept, whether the actors engaged in its implementation are fully aware of it 
and want it or not. But the core actors intend them, I think. For them, what I 
called «consequences» or «risks» are goals of a «restructuration sociale», as 
employers and conservative government in France say. The concept of 
competence and its diffusion is an important (though of course not the only) 
instrument to reach these objectives. 
The success of  the  competence campaign 
and an out look towards the future  
But how realistic is this strategy?  
To answer this question, I can give only some information about the success which 
the competence-campaign has enjoyed up to now in France and Germany – rather 
partial informations; they might nevertheless be useful for a realistic picture of the 
phenomenon and its possible future.  
Up to now the results of the competence-campaign are rather ambiguous: 
 
1) In scientific and public debate, the term competence is rapidly proliferating as I 
described before. But this does not always go together with the contents of this 
concept: The term ‘competence’ is more and more used just as a synonym for 
‘qualification’ or for parts of it (especially for informally acquired capacities). 
Thus, water is poured into the red wine, but the red colour is nevertheless 
diffusing – very ambiguous! 
2) As for the unions, in France, as far as I can see, MEDEFs integrative strategy as 
well as unions temptations ‘to be in the boat’ have considerable success. In 
Germany, where the implementation of the concept in society is less advanced 
than in France, there are indications of similar temptations. The traditional 
political approach of German unions not to fight new risky phenomena but to 
try to co-manage them (Gestaltungsansatz) may have contributed to this. But 
the confrontation of unions with the competence-concept is rather new and (as 
far as I can see) involving until now only their vocational training departments, 
not the much more powerful and power-conscious wage-bargaining 
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departments. Thus, critical discussions and resistance have still good chances to 
come.  
3) The positions of companies and employers organisations seem divided on this matter: 
Some companies are among the most eager promoters of the concept, especially 
those who profit from the numerous publicly funded pilot-projects on 
«competence-development» allowing them – with public money and scientific 
legitimation – experimentation and notable change of their Human Resource 
policy (often: the integration of training in the workplace and work process). But 
other firms are sceptical or negative – an interesting observation: In France, the 
companies of certain branches – like f. ex. chemical industry – want to stick to 
the diploma-system, not only because they are more or less satisfied with its 
efficiency, but also because they think diplomas necessary for the reproduction 
of branch identity and the branch-identification of their workforce. And in 
Germany, firms who follow a policy to invest in a broad modernisation of the 
Dual System of vocational training seem rather reluctant.  
 Employers organisations sometimes just reflect the position of the 
majority of their members, sometimes take own political initiatives pro – like the 
MEDEF-initiative I described before – or contra as the German top 
organisation of the metal and electricity industry did implicitely giving strong 
declarations to maintain the Dual System and investing in this policy.  
   Due to all these ambiguities, the future is rather uncertain.  
 One possible evolution is a roll back to classical qualification policy, due 
to the inner weaknesses of the concept of outcome orientation and the 
problematic long term effects it would have also for companies9; a roll back that 
might nevertheless include the integration of some elements of the competence-
approach like greater importance of work-integrated learning and some forms of 
their recognition in the framework of formalized learning tracks. 
 The other alternative is a continuous erosion of the value of diplomas in 
favour of company-driven assessment and recognition of the capacities that are 
relevant for the specific job; a process of erosion that might well go along with 
some – more and more decreasing – recognition of diplomas for a certain time 
or other forms of compromise. 
 The future of Europe’s qualificational space is open. It will be influenced 
not the least by affirmative or critical research on this matter. 
Some remarks regarding an adequate  
theoret ica l  interpretat ion of  the 
phenomenon  
How can we, how shall we interpret the complex empirical phenomenon of the 
emergence of the concept that I described?  
                                                 
9 For details see Drexel 2002 (note 2) 
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For many political scientists, sociologists, historians and political economists the 
answer is probably quite simple: The concept of competence is an element of 
neoliberalism, an instrument – among other instruments – of deregulation and of 
neoliberal re-regulation. 
I agree with this general interpretation, but I think it is not sufficient.  
Yes, it is correct to say that the concept aims at deregulation of existing knowledge- 
and labour market structures and at undermining collective agreements and existing 
political institutions and norms. And it is correct to say that by doing so it aims at 
creating space for new regulations, new institutions and new norms that are more 
favourable for companies. 
But this interpretation is not sufficient. It does not take into account the specific 
character of the competence-concept – ist character as an ideology – and the importance 
of this fact for the intended change process: Ideology defined in the sense of Marx as 
the «false true» (das falsche Wahre) is to be seen as a construction of ideas of its own 
quality: a construction of ideas that combines real facts and problems of the existing 
system with a specific interpretation that is functional for certain interest groups, but at 
the same time covers these ties to group interests under a specific way of arguing. 
If we don’t take into account this double-face character of the competence-concept 
that makes it an ideology, its surprising success could not be fully explained. Let me use 
the last 2 minutes to at least indicate this: 
 
1) The list of facts and real problems to which the competence-concept refers 
explicitly or implicitly is long and heterogenous. There are facts/problems that 
are more or less common to all EU countries like  
• the traditional underevaluation of practical experience (due to the 
hegemony of knowledge dating from a time when formal knowledge, 
especially academic knowledge, was rare),  
• growing scarcity of experience within the companies workforce (due to 
mass dismissals of elder workforce in the last years and growing 
percentages of young workforce coming from schools/universities),  
• tendencies of erosion of existing workforce categories and of their 
classical biographies (due to accelerated technical and organisational 
change making traditional qualifications obsolete as well as to economic 
crisis creating growing employment problems), 
• and so on 
  To these more general problems nationally specific ones have to be added. 
2) All these facts and problems have quite concrete causes. But the concept of 
competences does not address and analyse these causes directly. Existing 
problems are just implicitly appealed to and bundled – by a construction of ideas 
that define a well delineated corridor for specific forms of problem-solving: for solutions 
in favour of employers interests and – in a broader perspective – for the 
legitimation of new rules and regulations in society.  
 In the competence-concept – like in every ideology – this orientation of 
problem-interpretation and problem-solving-propositions to specific group 
interests is veiled – covered under a specific, rather unconcrete terminology that 
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is open to interpretation and to many connotations, including to connotations 
having a long tradition and an idealistic background. Such a veiling that is 
probably as necessary as appealing to real problems if existing education and 
training systems and existing labour market structures shall be deregulated 
though they are deeply rooted in the interests and norms of the national 
societies. 
  This fact certainly contributes to understand the strategy of the 
European Commission and national governments to involve on a large scale 
media and research in the implementation of the competence-concept. And it 
may underline my hypothesis that the future of this concept can be influenced 
by, among other things, critical research. 

  17
Centrally Coordinated 
Decentralization – No Problem? 
Lessons from the Italian Case 
Introduct ion 10 
I will present the results of an empirical investigation11 that I did between 1998 and 2001 
on new processes of decentralisation of bargaining on performance and wages – a 
research project asking essentially for the consequences of these processes for Industrial 
Relations. The investigated processes were implemented in Germany and Italy in the 90s 
– two quite different forms of decentralisation that might be even seen as extremes on a 
broad scale of possible forms: 
 
• one process transferring the bargaining on (parts of ) performance and wage to 
the individual level – i.e. between the individual worker (or small worker groups) 
and the direct superior – the German case; 
• the other process reducing collective agreements essentially to compensating for 
the inflation, transferring all the rest of bargaining to the company level (i. e. 
between employer and work council) – the Italian case. 
 
These processes of decentralization show – despite of their great differences – many 
parallels in the processes of their implementation in companies and in their 
consequences for Industrial Relations. These parallels facilitate the understanding of the 
complex implications of such processes – as well as do the numerous differences both 
in implementation and in their consequences. 
I will present a lot of – I hope interesting – concrete, but also some of the more 
general results of this research. For reasons of time and complexity I will present only 
one of the cases – Italy –, thus leaving the German case and the comparison to your 
individual reading. 
 I choose the Italian case 
• first because this is a really dramatic case of restructuration of the institutional 
system of Industrial Relations that can be seen as a model for restructuring the 
Industrial Relations systems of other countries; 
                                                 
10 Presentation at the Rokkan Centre on 12th September 2003. 
11 See: Ingrid Drexel: Neue Leistungs- und Lohnpolitik zwischen Individualisierung und Tarifvertrag. Deutschland 
und Italien imVergleich, Frankfurt/New York 2oo2. Ingrid Drexel: Ergebnisabhængige Entlohnung und 
Verbetrieblichung der Verhandlungen – Italiens neues Verhandlungssystem in der Praxis. In: WSI-Mitteilungen 
2oo2/6 
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• second because it allows to question a central thesis of established Industrial 
Relations research: the thesis that so-called «centrally coordinated (or: 
controlled) decentralisation processes» – i. e. processes of transferring 
bargaining that are agreed between top level social partners and state and 
regulated in their general terms – are a good solution for unions; 
• and last but not least because there seems to exist – if I understood correctly – 
some parallels between the new Italian system and some well established 
characteristics of the Norwegian system of Industrial Relations – a fact that 
might stimulate interest and the discussion following my presentation. 
 
I will start my presentation describing the main elements of the new Italian system of 
Industrial Relations and giving some explanations for its emergence in 1993. A third 
part will be dedicated to the process of implementation of this system, a fourth part to 
consequences for workers’ interest representation and defence. And I will end with 
some conclusions for research and political action of unions. 
The new archi tecture  of  Ita ly ’s  Industr ia l  
Relat ions and the Premio d i  Resultato   
In 1993, the central organisations of employers (among which the most important is 
Confindustria), of the three main unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL) and the government (at 
that time a center/left-wing government) concluded a tripartite agreement – the famous 
Protocollo of July 1993 – which implemented a concerted income policy and 
restructured profoundly the Italian system of Industrial Relations: 
The roles of central collective agreements and company-level agreements – up to 
then rather unregulated – were changed, regulated and separated clearly from each 
other. The rhythm of bargaining was strictly fixed (with 4-years periods for collective 
agreements on working conditions and 2-year periods for collective agreements on 
wages), and peace-keeping periods were strictly prescribed. All these new regulations 
made the old tradition of re-bargaining results of central agreements on company level – 
wherever the local power relations allowed this – illegal.  
 The task of collective agreements (in Italy negotiated on national branch level) was 
factually reduced to compensate the so-called «programmed» inflation, that is an 
inflation rate that is «concerted» between top employers organisations, unions and 
government before every round of central bargaining: Collective agreements shall 
«orient» themselves at the programmed inflation; differences between programmed and 
real inflation should be compensated in the next bargaining round. But also the 
economic situation of the branch, the labour market situation and even the inflation 
rates of other European countries should be taken into account (what normally means: 
reduce wage increases). Thus, though collective agreements continued to exist and 
autonomy of the social partners was formally respected, their factual bargaining 
autonomy was strongly undermined. 
Bargaining on any wage increases beyond inflation rate was transferred to the 
company level; and it was linked strictly to improvements of the competivetiness of the 
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company in terms of productivity, quality and/or rentability. Fix wage increases were 
excluded, all company-level bargained increases have to be variable and take the form of 
a Premio di risultato (literally: prime of result-Pdr in what follows), thus depending on 
the degree to which defined and bargained indicators for economic development were 
attained. The declared aim was to stimulate the work-motivations of the labour force 
and its identification with the fate of the company and to utilize better potentials for 
productivity and innovation that were generally supposed to «sleep» in the workforce of 
most companies. 
In this context, local labour representatives should get a central and new role: The 
employer, assisted possibly by a local representative of the employers’ organisation, and 
the company work council, assisted possibly by a local union representative, should 
negotiate and agree on a 2-year-program for the economic development of the company 
and on the construction of appropriate indicators and prime-schemes for the next 
period. This negotiation should be based on data showing the economic situation of the 
company to be given by the company. Bargaining results have to be fixed in a contract. 
And the work-council has the right to continuous and ex post control of the evolution 
of the indicators in order to control the evolution of the primes. All these elements were 
presented as important steps towards more information for labour and more 
«participation». 
The implementation of these regulations of the Protocollo was supported by their 
integration (with little modification) in the collective agreements of the branches and by 
public financial incentives for firms adopting the PdR and proving this by a PdR-
contract. 
Some remarks regarding the background 
of  the  new system 
The Protocollo was the product of a big bundle of many and very diverse interests of 
the national top actors (state, employers and unions); interests that were put together to 
a historically original compromise – asymmetric, but nevertheless a compromise. The 
main frame conditions necessitating and at the same time allowing this compromise 
were 
 
• the problematic situation of Italy’s economy wanting to enter into the Common 
Market in the first round, but having enormous difficulties to fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria;  
• the economic necessity to reduce the high inflation in view of the future 
impossibility to correct its negative effects for Italian export by devaluations of 
the Lira (as had been done up to then regularly); 
• and the resulting risk – especially feared by the unions – that employers’ answer 
to this situation would be a dumping strategy, with a shift to the low price sector 
and with marked reduction of wages and working conditions. 
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The stimulation of sleeping productivity-, quality- and innovation resources as well as 
some capital accumulation was seen as the better alternative to such a dumping strategy. 
This argument was of course central for the unions’acceptance of the Protocollo. A 
second main reason for them was that the Protocollo finally brought the formal 
recognition of central and decentralised bargaining levels, a recognition up to then 
inexistent, making bargaining dependent on local power relations. 
 The many other arguments for the Protocollo – less important or more partial like 
the employers’ interests to increase wage differentiation according to individual and 
company performance etc etc – cannot be dealt with here: I have to spare time for the 
results of the empirical parts of my research asking for the implementation of the 
Protocollo in the companies and in local labour representation and for the 
consequences.  
The implementat ion of  the new system – 
res istances and dynamics  
(a) One methodological remark ahead: In order to get a well profiled picture of the 
relations between decentralisation processes and Industrial Relations, I had opted in my 
research for an exemplary approach – doing fieldwork in a strong branch (the metal 
industry) in economically and politically «strong» regions – in Italy in the relatively 
wealthy and traditionally left-wing («red») Emilia Romagna. Therefore the more detailed 
results come from this region, which excludes a full generalisation for all Italy. 
 
1) Nevertheless I can and will start with three pieces of information regarding the 
implementation of the PdR in overall Italy to give you a first impression:  
• The diffusion of PdR was quantitatively and qualitatively very different, 
with much more contracts concluded in northern companies, in bigger 
companies and in those with higher percentages of unionized workforce.  
• The PdR-contracts showed very often – especially in the first bargaining 
round after 1993 – marked deviances from the regulations of the 
Protocollo. 
• Despite of this very «incomplete» implementation of the PdR, its 
economic results were considerable: The inflation rate fell to 1,7% in the 
first 4 years after 1993, and this largely at the cost of wages: The real 
wages went down, for ex. in the metal industry: -1.2% in 1994, -3,7% in 
1995 and -4.8% in 1996; and the wage quota was reduced from 67,2% in 
1992 to 62,3% in 1997. 
2) In the Emilia Romagna, the implementation of the PdR met much resistance – 
from part of the employers as well as from the majority of the labour force and 
their local representatives (work councils and local unions): 
 As for the employers, quite a lot of them found it to complicated to plan – 
together with the work council and local representatives of Confindustria and 
unions – the future economic development of the firm and to negotiate on that 
base corresponding indicator- systems and prime-schemes. Other employers 
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feared the political impacts of opening their books to the traditionally rather 
conflict-oriented work councils and local unions. But of course many other 
companies welcomed the new system. 
 Workforce and its local representatives on the other hand were mostly quite 
hostile towards the new bargaining system; this holds true especially for 
members and representatives of the mightiest union, the left-wing CGIL, but 
also for a good deal of rank and file of the more right-wing unions (CISL, UIL). 
This hostility was due to a widespread pragmatic scepticism as to the companies’ 
willingness to give fair information and to pay fairly productivity increases, there 
was a strong hypothesis of manipulation. But this hostility was also and may be 
even more due to contradictions existing between the new system and some 
political principles firmly rooted in the Emilia Romagna workforce since the 
great conflicts of the 60s and 70s: especially 
• the principle that wage claims should be determined according to 
workers’ wage needs and independently from the companies’ economic 
situation – a principle that of course excludes variability of wages and 
primes linked to profitability, which implies risk sharing;  
• and the principle that workforce representatives have to maintain 
autonomy with respect to company interests – a principle that excludes 
any form of co-management («role-diffusion» as they say) and any form 
of their integration in the companies’ competition strategies («firm 
sindicalism»). 
The consequence of such political principles were widespread problems of 
acceptance for the new system and much criticism – criticism that, according to 
most local unionists as well as managers I interviewed, continued to dominate 
still in the years of my fieldwork (1998–2001).  
3) But despite of this hostility work-councils and local unionists pushed the 
implementation of the new system: 
• necessarily because this was the only way to get the wage increases that 
were so much needed after a long period of wage stop – this made them 
fight for PdR-contracts; 
• but also because of political loyalty towards their union – this made 
them argue in favour of the new system, of its necessity or even value in 
their discussions with colleagues and rank and file. 
Thus by and by the traditional principles lost some weight in determining 
arguments and political action. And it was not without a moment of tragic that 
the logic of the new system forced very active and consequent labour 
representatives to participate in its implementation though they deeply 
disapproved it.  
 Nevertheless this situation – and the existing power relations including 
traditions of power utilisation – made the implementation a very difficult and a very 
incomplete process, much more so than in other regions of Italy: In the first 
bargaining rounds after 1993 work-councils and local unions insisted on a mix of 
traditional bargaining results and results in line with the Protocollo, and the 
companies had to accept this more or less (sometimes even anticipated the 
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necessity of such concessions). The bargaining results of the first two rounds 
therefore were complex compromises (often very tricky compromises); 
especially  
• combinations of fix salary increases and variable ones,  
• a relatively great weight for productivity- and quality-indicators (that 
workforce accepted) in the prime schemes, and little weight for 
indicators of profitability with their implications of risk-sharing;  
• almost in no firm individualized performance-related prime-schemes (as 
intended by the Protocollo), but either the same prime for all employees 
or prime differentiation according to classification differentials fixed by 
the collective agreements, 
• and on the other hand very modest results on information and 
«participation» issues. 
To summarize the significance of these «deviances» from core regulations of the 
Protocollo (and Confindustrias claims), it may be interesting that a great 
percentage of the PdR-contracts in Emilia Romagna were not co-signed by the 
local Confindustria-representatives as should be done, but only by local union 
representatives (and of course by the respective employer and work council).  
 But: To evaluate the whole process only on the base of these 
observations would be an error: A comparison of contracts negotiated in the 
companies I investigated in the first two rounds showed that in the second 
round the balance of compromise elements changed in favour of the company, 
– a tendency confirmed also more generally by local actors involved in many 
bargaining processes. So it became clear that the line of compromise was about 
to be transformed by a step-by-step process and that it was just this gliding 
character of change that helped the PdR-system to root and to develop its inner 
logic. 
Consequences for  workers ’  interest  
representat ion 
This brings me to the consequences for the Industrial Relations, – consequences that 
either were already visible during my research or can be concluded from its results. 
I will focus on three complexes of negative consequences, but include also some 
counteracting facts: 
 
1) The issue of differentiation and unity: 
Inherent in the transfer of wage bargaining beyond inflation compensation to 
the company level is of course a tendency of growing differentiation between 
economically strong companies and regions on the one hand and weak 
companies and regions on the other. This seems a great risk. Homogenisation of 
pay conditions is certainly not in every historical situation a good solution – it 
can easily make political unity break down. But in the Italian case there is a high 
probability that the PdR`s impulses for differentiation will make existing 
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differences between big and small companies as well as between northern and 
southern regions increase very strongly – even to a point of no return: With the 
economic function of the central collective agreement almost eliminated, there 
are no more mechanisms and instruments for homogenisation that could 
counterbalance these centrifugal tendencies. 
2) Problematic consequences concerning the local institutions of interest representation:  
The system of planning, negotiating and controlling economic indicators and 
primes certainly brings a lot of new competence and some new information for 
local labour representatives. But this implies for them the necessity to focus 
strongly on technical and economic issues – with the risk of loosing their energy 
for classical political issues of interest representation which – in a country with 
weak institutional labour rights like Italy – is absolutely necessary for union 
power. 
 Besides, in consequence of the participation of local labour 
representatives in the new system, the profile of their roles is changed: Whether 
they want it or not, they have to adapt their bargaining goals and activities to (I 
quote a local union representative involved in many of these bargaining 
processes) «what can be economically justified for the company instead of what 
is politically justified for workers’ needs».  
 These risks are aggravated by the fact that the local workforce 
representatives have to focus dominantly on the single company resp. on the 
two or three biggest local companies. Thereby, collective demands and action 
going beyond local company (or companies) can easily disappear from their 
strategies and agenda. This risk was much discussed within CGIL, and the 
unions try to fight it by elaborating and broadly diffusing regional and local 
guidelines for every round of company-level bargaining; guidelines that define 
common goals for company-level bargaining to be aimed at aside the company-
specific goals. The question of how efficient these guidelines can be under 
centrifugal pressures must remain open. 
 Last but not least, labour representatives accepting variability of wages 
and risk sharing and/or their integration in the companies’ competition policies 
apparently loose a good deal of the traditional confidence and support of their 
rank and file – often of the most active part of the workforce from whose 
loyalty and voluntary activities much of the strength of the unions in the Emilia 
Romagna depends.  
 3)  Consequences for workforce and their orientations 
First, even if the new system is mostly disapproved of it apparently makes its 
way into heads and behaviour: Interest for and orientation towards the firms’ 
economic situation is said to grow, the evolution of the indicators is watched, 
firms’ new philosophies are more listened to – in short: the mental integration of 
the workforce in the company and the identification with it seems to grow. And 
of course the ties between wage and the companies’ annual economic results 
tend to reduce conflictuality. 
 Moreover, with central collective bargaining loosing most of its objective 
economic function, there is a risk that central collective agreements and unions 
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also loose their subjective importance for workers. Nevertheless, the short-
sightedness of employers and state help for some countervailing tendencies – I 
will come back to this later on. 
 And last but not least, part of the workforce – especially politically active 
union members – seem to be profoundly disappointed, they tend to be resigned 
and to take some distance to the unions. Of course I cannot evaluate the 
quantitative importance of such tendencies, but they should not be 
underestimated given the great role of these active groups for union power. 
 (4)  Erosion of political culture and changes in society 
To summarize these and other changes in local labour representation and in 
rank and file orientations that result from the Protocollo, Italian interview 
partners often spoke of an «erosion of the political culture» of the Emilia 
Romagna. But they almost always add – company-representatives as well as 
labour representatives, and often in the same terms – that this erosion is also a 
consequence of two societal changes of the last 10 years:  
• on the one hand consequence of the fact that the population of the 
Emilia Romagna «lost the perspective of a transformation of the society» 
(the general circumscription of the breakdown of communism ); 
• and on the other hand consequence of the rupture between generations, 
i. e. of the massive entrance of young workers in the firms: workers with 
much higher formal qualifications and diplomas than their forerunners, 
but without the political socialisation the elder generation had acquired 
in the battles of the 60s and 70s. 
These societal evolutions certainly contribute to the political impacts of the new 
bargaining system. And they will with some probability speed up the full 
implementation of the new system when the elder generation leaves companies 
and local union offices in the next years. 
 (5)  Inherent contradictions and countervailing tendencies  
Nevertheless the evolution is not without inner contradictions and does not go 
only in one direction. As I announced before, there are countervailing 
tendencies: not only the strength of political traditions that don’t erode so 
quickly and under certain circumstances can even integrate young workers with a 
different background, – but also and may be even more the short-sighted and 
provocative policies of the opponent side. Such policies and their counteracting 
effects can be watched on three levels:  
• On the level of the individual company, restrictive bargaining policies, unfair 
prime-schemes, data manipulation, and last but not least the factual 
execution of risk share schemes (that are contractually agreed, but whose 
execution is nevertheless seen as illegitimate) risk to provoke wildcat 
strikes or covert forms of demonstrating workers’ discontent. 
• On the level of central bargaining, repeated policies of employers’ 
organizations and the state to underrate the difference between the 
programmed and the real inflation (a difference that according to the 
Protocollo has to be compensated in the following collective 
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agreements) lead to recurrent conflicts making workforce wait for a new 
collective agreement; a situation that has provoked several strikes.  
• And last but not least on the level of political institutions attacks from 
Confindustria and the Berlusconi-government against the two bargaining 
levels that had been acknowledged in the 1993 system became louder 
and louder since the end of the 90ies. These attacks aim at the 
elimination of one of the levels (preferably the central one of course) or 
at its transformation into a loose framework leaving almost everything 
open to local bargaining or unilateral decision by the companies. Such 
attacks absurdly bring the unions in a situation to defend the Protocollo 
system; but they can also destroy remaining illusions about 
«concertation» and the reliability of guarantees such a trilateral 
competition pact brings for labour interests.  
To summarize: Inherent in the historical situation that brought the Protocollo 
there are also forces that can countervail some of what I described as its negative 
consequences for labour, may be even revitalize some of its traditional strength 
in new form (if you think for ex. of the enourmous support for general and 
branch strikes of last year). But whether this will be enough to neutralize the 
day-to-day effects of the PdR ?? – I doubt! 
 For me, in consequence of all these contradictory forces and tendencies, 
the future of Italian Industrial Relation is open.  
 Nevertheless I can draw some conclusions for future research on 
decentralisation processes and for future political strategies on decentralisation 
issues. Four of these conclusions will be presented to end my contribution, three 
conclusions for research and one for unions policy: 
Conclus ions for  research and pol i t ica l  
act ion 
1) The value of the concepts «centralisation/decentralisation» and «regulation/de-
regulation» for categorising national systems as well as for qualifying them with 
respect to their impacts for labour interests – as classical Industrial Relations 
research often does – this value has its limits: As the Italian case shows, 
decentralisation does not necessarily exclude parallel centralisation. And central 
regulation can have the same negative effects for the defence of workers’ 
interests as in other countries’ deregulation (destruction of existing regulations): 
a weakening of the workers possibilities to defend their interests – in this case by 
restricting desentralised bargaining by regulating it strictly in the described way. 
2) The institutional model of a decentralisation process cannot be taken as the whole 
change process as many studies on changing Industrial Relations do. An 
approach restricting itself to the architecture of Industrial Relations is blind for 
the social processes that filter its concrete realisation as well as for the social 
processes that follow its implementation:  
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• It is blind for processes that transform the roles and attitudes of labor 
representatives of the different levels, blind for the reorientation of 
interests of bargaining actors and of the logics of their every day 
behaviour. 
• It is blind for the resulting transformation of the «spirit» with which 
institutions, regulations and roles are filled. 
• And it is blind for changes of the orientations of the workforce – 
changes in the «political culture» that in the long run might have the 
most important consequences. 
 3)  Therefore the fact that a decentralisation process is centrally coordinated is by no 
means reassuring for unions’ power as sometimes suggested by researchers and 
union representatives who recommend this form of giving space for more 
differentiation. Risks like firm syndicalism, integrating work councils in 
companies’ competition strategies on the one hand and growing apathy of the 
workforce destroying conflictuality on the other hand can weaken unions’ power 
considerably.  
 (4)  My political conclusion for the unions is therefore: Decentralisation can be a very 
dangerous strategy, – more dangerous than it seems at a first glance and in the 
short run.  
 But if unions cannot prevent it or even do want it – because of course 
unsatisfied impulses for more differentiation can also be very dangerous – than 
it is not enough just to coordinate and regulate its general framework at the 
beginning. Specific political answers to decentralization seem necessary to 
contain its inherent risks: answers that strengthen institutional and political ties 
and interactions between central and local processes. The most important 
answers are probably: 
• a policy of strengthening the political and ideological coherence of 
decentral bargaining processes with central issues: political discussions 
and targets/procedures that revitalize in rank and file and in local labor 
representatives general political orientations that go beyond single firms, 
– against the erosion of comprehensive orientations to and solidarity 
with general workforce interests;  
• and a policy to gain unions access to detailed information on the 
decentralised bargaining processes and their results – against the loss of 
all informational control of the evolution of the real incomes of the 
different fractions of the workforce – a control that seems absolutely 
necessary to conceptualize a realistic demand policy for remaining 
central bargaining and for a possible future policy of re-homogenisation. 
As the Italian case study shows, the necessarily long process of implementation 
of a new decentralized system – a process with underdetermination, 
uncertainties and the distrust and resistance among rank and file – can give a lot 
of space and occasions for such a politisation of local processes and for gaining 
information access if unions utilize this process strategically.  
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